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Ln the Suprente Court
of the State of Utah
ROYAL AUDREY BACKUS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8375

GUS S. HOOTEN and ELLA H.
HOOTEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff from a judgment dated :March 30th, 1955, and filed and entered
April 4th, 1955, dismissing the plaintiff's cornplaint on
the ground that said complaint does not state a claim
on which relief can be granted, Hon. Will L. Hoyt,
Judge. (Rec. 10).
For the purpose of this appeal all of the facts pleaded
in plaintiff's complaint, excepting the allegations of Paragraph XI thereof, mm;t be taken as true. Paragraph
XI alleges a legal conclusion presenting a point of law
which is the crux of this appeal.
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The material allegations of the complaint are short,
and for the convenience of the Court we deem it
able to set them forth verbatim.

advi~

Comes now the plaintiff above named, and for cause
of action against the defendants and each of them,
alleges:
1. 'rhat the said defendants are now and have
been during all of the times herein stated, husband
and wife, and residents within Beaver County, State
of Utah;

2. That on or about the 1st day of November,
1952, and prior thereto, one Jerry Busby was in
the business of levelling land and making improvements on lands so that the same would be susceptiqle of irrigation aml proper cultivation; that on
or about the 1st day of November, 1952, the defendants herein entered into a contract with the
said J err:v Busby h~T which said Busby was to level
a number of acres of land for them on their premises situated in Beaver County, Utah, and more particularly described as the north one-half of the
northeast one-quarter of Section 36, Township 2b
South of Range 11 \Vest, S. L. J\L, for a sum far in
excess of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), the exact
amount of ·which this plaintiff does not know;
3. That the defendai1ts herein did not obtain
from the said contractor, J err:T Busby, the boncl
for the benefit of themselves, as the owners of
said land, and for the benefit of those who would
furnish materials and labor in the performance of
said contract as contemplated h~T and required by
Chapter 2, Tit]e 14, Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, R. R.
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u.

1953;

-1-. That the said contractor, Jerry Bushy, was
insolvent, and depended for necessary labor and
materials and machinery and equipment to complete his said contract, upon such credit as he might
obtain from laborers, materialmen, and those able
to furnish him with the necessary machinery and
equipment and upon their reliance of a right to the
statutory bond aforesaid conditioned for the payment of their accounts.

5. That this plaintiff extended credit to the
said Jerry Busby, and delivered to him certain nlachinery and equipment to be used and which were
used in levelling· of defendants' said lands and thus
making improYements thereon. believing that the
said defendants herein had either procured a bond,
as provided hy the act aforesaid, or that they would
themselves be responsible for the reasonable rental
value of the said machinery and equipment thus
used for the benefit of their premises.
6. That this plaintiff delivered the said machinery and equipment to the said contractor Busby on
or about November 1st, 1952, and that plaintiff is
informed and believes and therefore alleges that
the said Busby used machinery and equipment in
the levelling of said lands commencing- with the said
<late, and ~ontinually thcn·afh•r until Deremher
L5th, 1952.
7. That the said Contractor Bushy agTP<'d to
pay for the rental of the said machinery a1Hl equipment the sum of $850.00, and which sum was the
rem;onable rental YahH· thereof for the period it
was so m~ecl; that no part of the sai<l sum has hcPn
paid by the said Busby, or anymw in his hrhalf, or
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by the defendants herein, excepting the sum of
$408.00, thus leaving a balance of $44:2.00 remaining

unpaid, all of which said sum is now due and payable.
8. That plaintiff is informed and believes and
therefore alleges that the eontract price for levelling said lands, stipulated for between the defendants and said contractor, if devoted entirely to the
payment of labor and materials and the rental of
said machinery, would have paid said accounts in
full; that during the progress of said work, the defendants paid or caused to be paid to the contractor
some of the contract price, but took no precautions
to have the said contractor pay this plaintiff's account in full, or in the eYent the said defendants did
not pay the said contractor any part of said contract price, then they haYe received the benefit of
the work so done by the contractor as aforesaid
without paying anything therefor;
9. That after commencing the said contract as
aforesaid the said contractor defaulted in the full
performance of his contract, leaving the contract
only partially performed and some of the work
uncompleted, and that the said defendants were
compelled to and did thereafter compl0te the said
work, or cause the same to be done.
J 0. That by reason of the said defendant's failing to procure a bond from said Bus by, as prO\'ided
by the statute, the~' were unable to compel the ~aid
Busby, or his sureties, to complete the contract;
and by reason of the foregoing ronditions this
plaintiff has no means of collecting her account as
aforesaid, except from the saicl defendant~.

11. That under the said statute

a~ nfm·psaid~

nnd
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by reason of the foregoing conditions and facts, the
said defendants are personally liable to this plaintiff for the balance due her as the reasonable rental
value of the said machinery and equipment ar:;
aforesaid. (Rec. 3-6).
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the gTound that it failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. (Rec. 7).
Thereafter the motion was argued and submitted to
the Court, who filed a memorandum of decision thereon
and held that the complaint did not state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and ordered the complaint
dismissed. ( Rec. 9) .
Accordingly, the Court then made its written order
!;Ustaining the motion and dismissing the complaint, and
''ordered, adjudged and decreed that * * * the complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed." (Rec. 10).
From the above order and judgment this appeal is
prosecuted.
STATEMENT OF THE POINT RELIED UPON
BY APPELLANT

That the Trial Court erred in determining and holding that the complaint did not state a claim upon which
relief could be gran ted ;
That the Trial Court erred in granting the respond-
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ents' motion to dismiss the complaint;
That the Trial Court erred in making and entering
its judgment dismissing ::-~aiel complaint.
The above points involve but one legal princi}Jle,
and ean and should be argued together.
ARGUMENT

The plaintiff contends her complaint Rtatcs a cause
of action against the defendants, under the provil--3ions
of Section 14-2-1 and Section 14-2-2, U.C.A. 1953. 'rhc de·
fendants contend to the contrary.
The material portions of the above statutory provisions are:
14-2-1. The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, for lhe
construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of
any building, structure or improvement upon land
shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the
contract price, with good and sufficient sureties,
conditioned for the faithful performance of the
contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor performed under the contract.
Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other
persons as theiT interest may appear; and any
person ·who has furnished materials or performed
labor for or upon any such building, structure or
improvement, payment for which haR not been
made, shall have a direct right of artion ag-ainst tlw
sureties upon snC'h hond for tlw reasonable va1nr
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of the materials furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed
upon;
14-~-2. Any person subject to the provisions
of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good
and sufficient bond * * * shall be personally liable
to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable
value of such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the
prices agreed upon.
It becomes necessary to construe Sec. 14-2-1 and to

determine whether a most strict and narrow construction
shall be given to the terms or improt'ement upon land and
labor performed under the contract, or whether a liberal

construction shall be given to these provisions of the
statute to effectuate the obvious intent of the statute.
The complaint alleges that the defendants entered
into a contract with one Bushy, a contractor, to level a
number of acres of land for them on their premises and
that the contract price was a sum far in excess of $500.00;
that the bond contemplated by Section 14-2-1 was not exacted from the contractor; that the plaintiff furnishect
and delivered to the contractor certain machinery and
equipment which was m;C'(l in the lPYelling- of thP defendants' land and making· improvements thereon, the samP
being furnished on credit believing· that the (lefendants
had either procured the statutory bond or that they themselves would he responsible for the reasonable rental
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value of the machinery . and equipment; that ..the contractor agreed to pay for the rental of the machinery and
equipment the reasonable value thereof, to-wit, $850.00,
.no part of which was .paid excepting $408.00, leaving a
balance of $442.00; that the contractor defaulted in the
work which defendants completed, and because of the
eon tractor's .insolvency plaintiff has no means of collect. ing her account except from the defendants.
The complaint does not go into detail as to how or in
what manner .o.r to what extent the. levelling of land is
an improvement; but if the defendants by answer or at
a pre-trial contend ~that such wurk is not .a permanent
improvement, then at a trial the plaintiff would ·provide
;~uch evidence in detail. Also at a trial the plaintiff would
prove that the heavy and expensiYe power machinery
'would be considerably· moTe . economical, 'efficient and
speedy than the old' method. of levelling ground by hand
or by team and scraper Dr fresuo. Also the plaintiff
could prove at ·a trial, if it was denied, that the work done
was a· permanent improvement, ·that farming lanas could
·not be efficiently irrigated l1nless lands were levelled and that such permanent improvement was economical, necessary 1and valuable,· effecting a Yery considerable ·saving in the ·use of ''Tater.
·we believe the· Court can take. judiCial notice that
the -levelling' of land is, a· permanent improvement, and
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that snell work is commonly and generally done by power
machinery and what is commonly known as "land
planes'' powered by tractors.

Unlike plowing of land,

planting of crops, etc., which likely could be classified as
annual work and not an improvement in the sense contemplated by the statute, the levelling of land is as permanent an improvement upon land as would be the con·
struction of a reservoir or the excavation necessary for
a cellar or basement under a home.
\Ye cannot believe that the word ''improvement''
upon land following the words ''building, structure'' was
ever intended to be limited to a building or structure or
something of that nature built upon the ground.

It will

no doubt be contended by the defendants that the Iangauge ''construction'' of an improvement should be
given a strict interpretation as being limited to erecting
soD..te building or placing something on the ground by
and with new materials. \\' e contend that when earth is
moved, high spots in land removed, low spots filled in,
and the contour of the ground made level for good irri··
gation that the work done is the consfr11diou of 011 impror(')ll cnt on land.
The TTtah Supreme Court has had

oeen~wn

to con

strue and rule upon the statute in question in two eases,
to-wit: Rio nro11rlr n;. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 Pac. 241,
and Libf'rfy rnol and TJI!Hil)('f ro. 1'8. 8now, fii3 Utah 208,
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178 Pac. 341.
In the Rio Grande rs. Darke case the primary question was whether the statute was constitutional. !lowever, Justice Thurman, in a well considered opinion,
made the follo"Ting observation (page 246 of 167 Pac.):
''The aim and purpose of our mechanic's lien
law manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards,
those who perform the labor and furnish the matena!s which enter into the construction of a building or other improvement.''
In the Liberty Coal rs. Snow case the factual situation is different, but the court made the following g-eneral observations concerning the statute in question:
''A mere cursory reading of Section 1 of said
chapter shows that its terms are very broad and
sweeping. * * * The purpose of the statute is to
prevent the o·wners of land from having their lands
improved vvith the materials and labor furnished
by third persons, and thus to enhance the value of
such lands, without becoming personally responsible for the reasonable value of the materials and
labor which enhances the value of those lands. The
owner may, however, eseape personal liability by
obtaining the bond required h~T the statute * * *"
This Court in the case of Jfellen vs. Yondor-Horst
Bros., et al., 44 Utah 300, 140 Pac. 130, in construing

Section 1400x Compiled LawR of Utah, 1907, which was
the forerunner of 14-1-1 U.C.A. 1953, Rtatf'd:
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"The statute we have quoted is, in and of itself, highly remedial, and must thus, in furtherance
of justice, receive a liberal construction and application so as to accon1plish its real purpose and object."
In principle the same rule of construction should be
applied to Section 14-2-1; the only difference being that
Sec. 14-1-1 deals with contracts pertaining to public
work, buildings, etc., and Section 14-2-1 deals 'vith private contracts-each section providing for a bond to protect those furnishing labor and/or materials, and each
~ection

followed by another section creating a direct liability for failure to procure such bond. (See Sertions 141-3 and 14-2-2 U. C.A. 1953).

l\fost certainly an individual under the private contract statutes is not and should not be in a rnore enviable
"md favorable position than a county, municipal corporation, board of education or state institution, board or
association under the pn hlic contract statutes.
There can be no question that Section 14-2-1 1~ a
highly remedial ;;;tatnte, ancl should receive a liberal construction and applieation so as to accomplish its }'(>a! purpose and objection. ~Toreover, such a ~tatut<~ shonlfl be
governed by the same principles of liberal construciion as the mechanic's lien Jaw since it is designed to
protect persons furnishing- labor and/or mah~rial~ for
1he benefit of a lancl owner. Tn TTfoli-Parifir DirJI':·d, VoL
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26, Sec. 3, will be found nun1erous cases from all \Vestern jurisdictions holding ''the lien of mechanics, artisans
and materialmen, is favored inlaw, because those parties
have, in part, created the very property on which the
lien attaches'' and ''lien statutes being remedial in their
nature, should be liberally construed'' and ''lien statutes,
being equitable in purpose and remedial in nature, are
to receive a liberal construction."
This Court has expressed itself on the question in
the case of Elwell vs. Morrow, 28 Utah 278; 78 Pac. 605,
in which it is said:
''The weight of authority is to the effect that
the well estabHshed rule that remedial provisions of
statutes are to be liberally construed applies to and
should be follo·wed in proceedings to foreclose mechanics' liens. ''
It was contended before the trial court that the plaintiff having furnished machinery and equipment to the
contractor is not protected by and does not come within
the purview of Sec. 14-2-1 because the bond which is required thereb~r shall be conditioned for the faithful performnace of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor performed thereunder; and that
the furnishing of machinery and equipment on a rental
basis is neither furnishing material or performing labor.
We assume that a land owner who has completely
ignored the provisions of Rection 14-2-1 and failed to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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protect himself by taking a bon.d from t4e\ (.~<>A tractor,
cannot claim .to be in a ;more favora.ble. posit~on. than the
surety who executes,the bond for.. th~

b.en~fit

.tractor .. What .is .the)iabihty of the surety
a bond '.' condition~d for; the

.faithfl~l

of,the con-

w4P.

.executes

pe,rf.ormaij_ce of the

contract and p;rpmpt. ,payment .for :waterial fq.rnished
.and .labor perfonned under· tha cont;ract,'' as required by
.the .statute?. Is not the liability ,of the ,lan,d

own~r

equal

to that.. of the surety, o:r m,ay theJGtn.d 1owner l~ap an aclYantage. by failing to p1:ocl1re.: the bond 1
. , We .thin)\: the answ,er is, to :be· found .in. the, case of

J. F.

1~oltoJt

lnr. Co.

Jlaryland Casualty Co., .77 Utah
2.26,. ·293 Pac:. 611.. This case was depided in 1930, and
.has never. been, oYerruled or modifie,d, jn whol~ or in
1JS.

part. : On: the. contrary it is c~teq

.wit4

~pproval in the

case ·of McCormick Baeltz('r f1o. t·s. Haidlen, 6 Pac. :2wl

. 255 (Cal}, and :the saii,le. rule followed. .in .Shoshone Lurnber Co. vs. Pirl('lity &; DerJost;t eu. of 1lla·;~1Jfrnul, :24 Pac.
~nd

690 .(Wyo.).
Ref erring'Jo.' the 7' olt rm. rs. ill aryl 011 rl

(! o s If o lty

easr,

Bnpra, a· ,bond was givel). pursuant to tl)e provisions of
Sec. 14-1-1 on a tpa:d building project.

The contractor

Rnbcontracted · a portion of the. joh aml th<> defendant
·'\faryland Casnalt:T Co.-, af-1 surety, ('XPcntecl a bond conditioned that the subcontract(ln ''shall well and truly pay

all an<l.every

pP;r~on ·fnrn.iRhin·~·

m:ltc•r,ial or, .rctrforming
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labor in and about the construction of said roadway all
and every sum or sums of money due him, them or any
of them for all such labor and materials for which the
subcontractor is liable.'' The statute requires a bond
conditioned ''that the contractor wiH promptly make
payment to all persons supplying labor or materials used
in the prosecution of the work." \Ve see no difference
between the statutory language and that used in the bond
in question, so far as the conditions are concerned.
A claim was made by the plaintiff and its assignors,
that the surety was liable under the terms of the bond
for small parts and accessories for automobiles and
trucks used in the work, for gasoline, oil and grease for
~se in machinery used on the job, for hauling coal, oil
and grease from railroad to highway construction, and
for rental for engine used by highway subcontracto·r in
constructing the highway, as well as for groceries and

supplies furnished for boarding house conducted by the
sn hcontractor.
The claim was resisted on the ground that these
items did not constitute either labor or materials used in
the prosecution of the work. In sustaining the plaintiff's right to look to the surety for payment of these
items, this court went far beyond the liability claimed
in the case at bar against the land owner. However, since
one of the claims involn~d was for the rental of an ~nSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gine, we deem it appropriate to quote from the Court's
opinion on that point:
"The last i tern in dispute is the plaintiff's
claim amounting to $7 4.23, the balance due for
rental of an engine used on the job. As in the case
of most of the other items in dispute, there i~ a
conflict in the decisions as to whether a charge of
this kind is within the contractor's bond. There
are many cases upon the subject which are collected in an annotation found in 44 A.L.R. 381. vVithout further reference to the cases it may be said
that under the liberal statute of interpretation to
which we are committed, we conclude that the
charge in question is within the obligation of the
bond and that the ~nrPty was properl:· held liable
therefor."
This court also stated:
''As a general proposition, bonds of this kind
do not secure payment for permanent equipment
furnished the contractor * * The purpose and intent of the bond is to ~l'cnre payment for thoKe
things which g·o into the work or contribute to itR
completion. ''
oj(,

The (\nut in tl!C' 'rolton cas<' l'C'Yi<'WC'<l the brg·c·
nnmher of cas0s f'i 1<·<1 by both the appellant and tlw 1'\'}Jonclent, and it wonld s<'n'P no nsefnl pnrposC' to qnoh!
at length from that opinion since no donht the en.-;<• i1~elf
wil1 he rearl, analyzed and (ligeste(l h:r this C:onrt. Rnffice it to say that this C:onrt has nnnonncNl what it heliP\·es to he the wPig·ht of nutlwrit~T ancl is committed to
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the liberal doctrine.
In the later California case, lJJcCormick 8aeltzer
Co. vs. Haidlen, 6 Pac. 2nd 256, the same question was
before the court, and the court said :
''The rule seems to be now well established
that bonds furnished under the Public Works Act
of this State are to be liberally construed to effect
the manifest purpose of the statute; the theory being that the statute here under consideration was
intended to cover all those things which contributed to the improvement, whether directly or physically going into the construction, or indirectly by being entirely used or consumed in the construction.
(Citing numerous cases), In a number of these
cases it was held that rental of machinery, money
expended on the hiring of teams, money spent for
provisions, equipment, etc., are all recoverable
against the surety.''

National Surety vs. Bratnober Lurnber Co., 122 Pac.
337 (Wash), involves a claim for furnishing horses on a
job.
IJ;Jultnomah County vs. United States F & G Co., 180
Pac. 104 (Ore.), involves a claim for horses rented and
held that services of horses constituted "labor" within
the meaning of the bond.
We believe the Oregon Supreme Court in the case
of Multnomah Co1tnty vs. U. 8. F & G Co., 170 Pac. 525,
at page 527, has stated the situation with g-reater clarity
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anu emphasis than could the plaintiff, and we quote:
''According to the strict legal definition of the
term ''labor and material'' the use of the engine
would not be embraced therein. There can be no
question but that the service of the machine in the
actual grading of the highway, as alleged in the
complaint, is covered by the language of the contract and bond * * * Statutes like the one in question haYe usually been and should be given a liberal construction so as to carry out the legislative
intent and effect the purpose contemplated by the
law. * * * In the case at bar if the work mentioned
had been performed by the exercise of the muscles
of laborers, there would have been no question but
that the same was protected lJ~t the statute. \Vith
the hard surface road paYement coming into \'O,:.!.'lW,
new methods of road construction utilizing high
power machiner:·, equipment and appliances haYl'
superseded the old mode of construction \\"ith pick
and shovel. It seems to us that it was intended bv
the enactment, as expressed by the lawmakers, thdt
the construction of an improvement, such as a
paYec1 higlnYa~-, should he pai<1 for; that in order
to carry ont the intc,nt of the law it was the right
and duty of the county officials to require a bond
protecting; the pa:vment of ohli~·ations incnrrt>d for
labor or material approximatilt,Q,' the constrnction
work. Plainly the bond ancl contrae1 in qnestion
made such provisions and nomiwl1<'<1 the item siw<1
for. The lnngnage of the stahtt<' indie;1tes that thC>
lmvwak<'rs had in minc1 tlw modc>rn rolH1i tions prc>··
vailin~: at the time of the rnactmc>nt. ( ,\ncl on page
526 of 170 Pac. in this case, it is said: rrhe act and
the bond are susceptible of a more liberal construction than tlw lien statutes).
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In Fuller vs. Brooks, :246 Pac. 369 (Old), the ~arne
question was before the court and it was urged that the
defendants were only liable under the statutory bond tor
the value of such material as was used in the improvement and cited several cases to support this contention.

The court said:
''Several of the cases involve the enforcement
of mechanic's lien between materialmen and the
owners of the improvements. The defendants desire to make the rule applicable to the enforcement
of the mechanic's lien, as the guide in construing
the bonds given pursuant to Section 7486, supra.
The liability upon a bond given pursuant to Section 7486 is not always measured by the rule applicable to the enforcement of the mechanic's lien between the owner of the improvements and the materialmen. There is a distinction to some extent
between the principles applying in the respective
cases. * * * The rule for determining the defendant's liability for the value of the material involves in this case is whether the particular materials were consumed in the course of the construction
of the improvements. \V e cannot see any difference between the nature of human force and mechanical force expended in the constrnction of a
public improvPment. Certainly the defendants are
liable for the l-,hysical efforts of the laborers. We
cannot see any distinction between individual force
consumed and expended and that of mechanical
force and power 0xpended and consumed in doing
the same work. In fact, common experience has
proven that much of the labor formerly done by
persons can be accompliRhed b~r mechanical nw:m~
for less expense.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
vVe concede that most of the cases cited, particularly
ihose having to do with the question of whether rentals
for machinery shall be considered as ''furnishing material or performing labor,'' are cases in which bonds were
given under the public contracts statute and not under
the pri~·ate contracts statute. It will be noted that our
public contracts statute (Sec. 14-1-1) is designated as
''Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.'' Our
private contracts statute (Sec. 14-2-1) has the identical
designation. There can be no question but what the object and purpose of each statute is the same and the conditions of the bond required is the same, to-wit: ''for
the faithful performance of the contract and for the
prompt payment for material furnished and labor performed under the contract.
~tatutes

The language of the two

differ slightly in the manner of expression, uut

the difference is in words only, not intent or substance.
The one substantial difference is that under 1hP ptl blic
contracts statute, a bond is requin·<l in·psrweti\'C of
amount since no lien can attach to public works, and mtder the private contrads statnt<· the bond is reqt•ircd
when the amount is in c·xeess of $500.00. \VP submit,
therefore, that the principles gov<·rning the construction
and interpretation of the pn blic works sta tnte arc controlling in tlw construction and interprc>tation of thc> private contracts statute.
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CONCLUSION

We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff's complaint does state facts sufficient to entitle her to the relief sought, that is, the unpaid rental value of the machinery furnished and we submit that the judgment
should be reversed and the case remanded for further
''
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINE, WILSON & CLINE,

Attorneys for Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

